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International Tax Program, Harvard Law School 
and 
Boston College Law School 
Summary. - To alleviate the problems caused by the brain drain, Professor Bhagwati proposes 
that professional, technical, and kindred persons who emigrate from less developed countries be 
subjected to a special tax on the income they earn in developed countries. This paper highlights 
the political and legal issues raised by his proposal and examines three approaches to imple- 
mentation: a tax levied by the less developed country, a tax levied by the developed country, 
and a tax levied by the United Nations. Specific aspects of the proposal which require further 
study and refinement, such as administrative feasibility, are outlined. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Appraisal of the problem 
Skilled manpower is a key ingredient of 
economic development. For a number of years, 
however, many less developed countries (LDCs) 
have experienced what is popularly known as a 
‘brain drain’-the emigration of their most 
talented individuals to the developed countries 
(DCs). The emigration is due in part to the 
higher salaries prevailing in the DCs. An LDC 
that is unwilling or unable to offer comparable 
salaries will often lose essential professional, 
leadership, and entrepreneurial abilities. Other 
problems occur even if the LDC is able to 
compete with the salaries offered in the inter- 
national market. Although more professionals 
are induced to stay at home, their relatively 
high salaries create harsh income inequalities 
and social strain within the LDC. 
In response to these problems, Professor 
Jagdish Bhagwati of MIT has suggested taxing 
the earnings1 of professionals, technicians, and 
kindred persons (PTKs) who emigrate to DCs. 
The tax would have a number of objectives. 
First, by effectively reducing the existing 
salaries for PTKs in the international market, 
the tax would allow the LDC to pay its resident 
PTK a wage that was more consistent with the 
social objectives of the country. The trend 
toward increased income inequality might then 
be partially averted. Second, the revenue from 
the tax would help compensate the LDC for the 
burdens imposed by emigration. Third, the tax 
would enable the LDC to share in the improved 
incomes of its emigrants. Finally, by reducing 
* The authors wish to express their sincere appre- 
ciation to Michael J. McIntyre, Director of Training, 
International Tax Program, Harvard Law School, for 
his critical insights in reviewing an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
1. Although our analysis is concerned with the 
taxation of earned income, our conclusions are 
generally applicable to the taxation of unearned 
income. 
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the economic returns to emigration, the tax 
might discourage the loss of manpower.* 
In order to accomplish these objectives, 
Bhagwati proposes that the host DC levy a 
special tax on the earnings of immigrant PTKs. 
The DC would then remit the proceeds of the 
tax to the LDC of origin. Alternatively, 
Bhagwati suggests that the tax on PTK earnings 
be levied by the United Nations, with the pro- 
ceeds either remitted to the LDC of origin or 
earmarked for general developmental aid to the 
LDCs. 
Imposing a tax on PTKs to alleviate the 
losses caused by the brain drain raises funda- 
mental moral and political questions about the 
individual’s relationship to society and his 
rights of self-realization and fulfilment.3 The 
crux of the problem lies in balancing the legiti- 
mate interests of society against the interests of 
the individual. Given the disparate economic, 
cultural, and perhaps political perspectives of 
the DCs and the LDCs, opinions will differ on 
how the balance should be struck. 
The DCs will tend to strike the balance on 
the side of the PTK and will react negatively if 
the tax has a serious impact on emigration. 
Moreover, even if the impact is negligible, some 
will find the tax offensive if the PTKs’ primary 
motive for leaving the LDC were to escape 
political or religious oppression. The fairness 
and justice in placing financial responsibility for 
aiding the LDCs on the shoulders of the PTKs 
will also be questioned, especially if emigration 
was the result of a lack of professional oppor- 
tunities in the LDC. Indeed, comparing the 
immigrant PTK with citizens of the DC, some 
may argue that instead of paying a tax, the PTK 
deserves to be compensated for the hardships 
and cultural deprivation he endured while in 
the LDC. 
The LDCs, by comparison, will strike the 
balance on the side of society. Mitigating the 
harsh economic conditions in the LDC will take 
priority over the desires of individuals. The 
PTK will thus be seen as having an obligation to 
contribute to his country’s development. If the 
salary and the standard of living enjoyed by the 
PTK in the DC are compared with conditions in 
the LDC, the emigrant PTK will appear to have 
the capacity to bear an additional tax burden. 
Furthermore, the LDCs will urge that the DCs 
have not only an obligation but also the 
capability necessary to administer any tax 
designed to impose that burden. 
Since no simple means of resolving these 
issues exists, the Bhagwati proposal should be 
structured so that it minimizes the differences 
in perspective between the LDCs and the DCs. 
At the least, the rate of tax should be low 
enough so that it does not materially affect the 
individual’s decision to emigrate. Subject to this 
caveat, two alternatives seem realistic. In view 
of the sensitive issues of human rights involved 
-rights that may be guaranteed under inter- 
national law”-one alternative would be for the 
United Nations to design and administer the 
tax. Reaching a consensus among the members 
of the United Nations with respect to the 
implementation of the tax might be difficult, 
however. 
A second alternative would be to conform 
the Bhagwati proposal as closely as possible to 
existing patterns of taxation. Under this 
approach, the LDC would tax the foreign earn- 
ings of all its non-resident citizens, rather than 
singling out PTKs for special treatment. As long 
as the PTK remained a citizen of the LDC, he 
would automatically fall within the LDC’s 
jurisdiction. In taxing the earnings of all of its 
non-resident citizens, the LDC would be adopt- 
ing an approach already used by the United 
States, Mexico, and the Philippines. 
An LDC tax on the foreign earnings of all 
non-resident citizens may not be practicable for 
very many LDCs because of enforcement pro- 
blems. Nonetheless, we have chosen this alter- 
native as the focus of our paper because dis- 
2. The restrictions that each DC imposes on entry 
may already reduce immigration to a level below what 
would exist in the absence of all controls. Thus, the 
tax could affect only the size of the waiting list (i.e., 
the excess demand) for entry into the DC, and not the 
actual level of immigration. The effect of the tax on 
immigration levels must be distinguished, however, 
from the effect of the tax on an individual’s decision 
to emigrate. A reduction in the size of the waiting lists 
would indicate that the tax has deterred some indivi- 
duals from attempting to emigrate. 
3. To be sure, the immigration restrictions of the 
DCs may raise similar philosophical problems. Emigra- 
tion and immigration restrictions do differ, however, 
in at least one important way. Since immigration 
restrictions vary from country to country, an indivi- 
dual may be prevented from entering the DC of his 
preference, but he will no doubt be able to obtain 
entry to some other DC. That option would obviously 
be precluded if the tax were an obstacle to leaving the 
LDC at all. 
4. For a discussion of the possible conflicts between 
the Bhagwati proposal and rights guaranteed under 
international law, see Frank Newman, ‘The brain drain 
tax and international human rights law’, paper pre- 
sented at the Bellagio Conference, 15-19 February 
1975, and to appear in the volume edited by Bhagwati 
and Partington, Taxing the Brain Drain: A Proposal. 
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cussion of an LDC tax will highlight many of 
the legal and administrative issues underlying 
the Bhagwati proposal. An understanding of 
these issues is necessary to evaluate competing 
proposals and to provide a foundation for 
further discussion. 
Many of the legal and administrative issues 
raised by the Bhagwati proposal are complex 
and involve matters of dispute among tax 
specialists. Because of the varied backgrounds of 
the conferees, we will not attempt to present 
the debates in detail, but rather only a broad 
outline of the major issues. We will concentrate 
on the refinements needed to make the 
Bhagwati proposal feasible and acceptable in 
view of general notions of international tax 
equity. 
Given the theme of this conference, we will 
also explore briefly other tax measures for 
transferring resources to the LDCs. For 
example, PTKs could be encouraged, rather 
than compelled, to make contributions to the 
LDCs through the use of tax incentives. 
Another approach would be for the United 
Nations to assess the host DCs, rather than the 
PTKs, and remit the proceeds to the LDCs. 
Though these other approaches might not 
accomplish all of Bhagwati’s goals, one or a 
combination of them could prove ultimately to 
be the most politically acceptable response to 
the brain drain. 
B. International income trix rules 
Many of the legal issues raised by a tax on 
emigrant PTKs are jurisdictional in nature. That 
is, they involve the rules governing the extent 
of a country’s taxing powers. Countries have 
generally exercised self-restraint in asserting 
their tax jurisdiction. The practicalities of 
enforcement and the fear that a broad assertion 
of jurisdiction might offend foreign govern- 
ments have kept countries from exercising their 
taxing powers in ways that would create 
conflicts among countries. Accordingly, rules of 
tax jurisdiction exist in the sense that certain 
patterns of taxation are acceptable as a matter 
of international custom. No international law 
exists, however, defining the outer limits of a 
country’s tax jurisdicti0n.s 
In order effectively to assert jurisdiction to 
tax income, a country must rely on some 
minimum connection or nexus between itself 
and the taxpayer or between itself and the 
income being taxed.6 In terms of the nature of 
this nexus, tax systems can be classified into 
two major groups: schedular systems and global 
or unitary systems. Under a pure schedular 
system, the jurisdictional connection is the 
source of the income.7 Only income from 
domestic sources is taxed;a no jurisdiction is 
asserted over income from foreign sources. 
Since all countries tax income from domestic 
sources, any country that uses a schedular 
system-that taxes only domestic income- 
exercises the most limited form of tax jurisdic- 
tion. 
In a global system, an additional jurisdic- 
tional connection is the personal status of the 
taxpayer. Jurisdiction is thus based on two 
independent factors: the source of the income 
and the status of the taxpayer. Under most 
global systems, residence is the connection 
relied on in asserting tax jurisdiction over 
individuals. In a few countries, including the 
United States, Mexico, and the Philippines, 
citizenship alone is a sufficient connection.9 
These countries, however, also tax non-citizens 
who are residents. That is, either status- 
citizenship or residence-is sufficient for the 
assertion of tax jurisdiction, though the vast 
majority of taxpayers are both citizens and 
residents. Countries using a global system tax 
all income of their citizens and residents, 
regardless o,f its geographical source. In other 
words, income from foreign sources is taxed 
along with domestic income. 
The difference between taxing on a 
residence basis and taxing on a citizenship basis 
can be illustrated by considering taxpayer A, 
who is a citizen of country X. Assume A moves 
abroad and is no longer considered by X to be a 
resident. If X taxes on the basis of citizenship, 
5. Compare Matin Non, ‘Jurisdiction to tax and 
international income’, Tax Law Review, Vol. 17 
(1962) p. 431, with Stanford Ross, ‘United States 
taxation of aliens and foreign corporations: the 
Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 and related 
developments’, Tax Law Review, Vol. 22 (1967) 
p. 363. 
6. Norr, op. cit., p. 432. 
7. ibid., p. 434. 
8. Different types of domestic income may be taxed 
in different ways. See, generally, ‘Schedular and global 
income taxes’, in Richard M. Bird and Oliver Oldman 
(eds.), Readings on Taxation in Developing Countries 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, rev. ed. 1967). 
p. 132. The personal status of the taxpayer may be 
relevant in determining the rate applied to the income. 
9. See, generally, Douglas Sherbaniuk, Henry 
Hutcheon, and Pearley. Brissenden, ‘Liability for tax- 
residence, domicile or citizenship?‘, in Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Report of Proceedings of the Seventeenth 
Annual Tax Conference (Toronto, 1964) p. 315. 
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A’s change of residence will be irrelevant and X 
will tax A not only on income earned within X, 
but also on any income earned abroad. By 
comparison, if X taxes only on the basis of 
residence, it will no longer assert jurisdiction 
over A on the basis of his personal status. Thus 
X will not tax A on income earned abroad. X 
will tax A, however, on income received from 
sources within X. In this case, the source of the 
income is a sufficient connection with the 
country to warrant the assertion of its tax 
jurisdiction. 
Most income tax systems are hybrids, 
employing some combination of the global and 
schedular concepts. For example, a global-type 
system might tax foreign income differently 
from domestic income. To this extent, foreign 
income would receive schedular treatment. A 
global system is probably used more often by 
the DCs, a schedular system more often by the 
LDCs. The trend, however, in the LDCs is 
toward use of the global approach. 
II. APPROACHES TO THE TAXATION 
OF EMIGRANT PTKs 
This section analyses three basic approaches 
to the taxation of emigrant PTKs. Part A 
considers the problems raised in the extension 
of an LDC’s tax jurisdiction to reach the earn- 
ings of emigrant PTKs. In Part B, Bhagwati’s 
proposal of a DC tax is treated by examining 
the case of the United States. The use of a 
deduction for charitable contributions is also 
discussed as an alternative measure. Part C 
explores two approaches the United Nations 
can adopt: a tax on PTKs and an assessment on 
host DCs based on the benefits they have 
received from the immigration of PTKs. 
A. LDC taxation of emigrant PTKs 
1. Jurisdictional issues. In order to tax the 
income earned abroad by an emigrant PTK, the 
LDC must assert jurisdiction on the basis of the 
personal status of the PTK. If the LDC relies on 
residence as its jurisdictional nexus, as do most 
global-type countries, the jurisdictional issue 
involved in taxing the PTK is the definition of 
‘resident’. 
The definition of ‘resident’ varies markedly 
from country to country. Some countries 
follow specific rules that define residence in 
terms of the period of time a person has been 
within or without the country. Other countries 
decide the question on an almost ad hoc basis, 
with little guidance from statutes. Often, a 
combination of the two approaches is 
adopted.10 
Whatever the approach, the basic question 
is: at what point does a PTK working abroad 
cease being a resident of the LDC? The factors 
that most countries would consider are the 
intent of the PTK with respect to his being 
abroad, the length of his stay abroad, and the 
nature of his contacts with both countries. For 
example, a PTK who was sent abroad by his 
employer for short-term training would clearly 
remain a resident of the LDC. In contrast, the 
PTKs whom the Bhagwati proposal is intended 
to reach-those who have emigrated abroad-are 
the least likely to fall within the usual concepts 
of residence. 
In order to assert jurisdiction over emigrant 
PTKs, the LDC has two options. The first is to 
define residence in terms of a person’s prior 
contacts with the LDC, even though all these 
contacts may have been severed long ago. This 
definition of residence would be broader than 
that so far adopted by any country. As 
explained in Section I(B) such a broad assertion 
of jurisdiction could not be said to violate inter- 
national law, but because it would be out of the 
mainstream of international custom and 
practice, two serious problems could arise. 
First, the DC might refuse to recognize the 
LDC’s definition, especially since it would con- 
flict with the DC’s claim of residence over the 
PTK. A DC that viewed the LDC’s assertion of 
jurisdiction as illegitimate would obviously not 
co-operate with the LDC in policing the tax on 
PTKs. Second, the LDC’s claim of residence 
would make little sense to a PTK who had cut 
all his ties with the LDC. He might therefore 
ignore the claim and refuse to comply volun- 
tarily with the tax. 
The second option is for the LDC to follow 
the pattern established by the United States, 
Mexico, and the Philippines, and assert tax 
10. For illustrations of the approaches some countries 
use, see Harvard Law School, International Tax Pro- 
gram, World Tax Series (hereinafter WTS): Taxation in 
Australia (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958) 5/l; 
WTS, Taxation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1963) 2/2; 
WTS, Taxation in Sweden (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co., 1959) 5/l. The definition of resident mav be 
different for citizens or nationals than for aliens: See 
WTS, Twation in Colombia (Chicago: Commerce 
Clearing House, Inc., 1964) 11/1.2. 
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jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship. 11 Since 
these three countries apply citizenship jurisdic- 
tion uniformly to all citizens, the LDC could 
not limit citizenship jurisdiction to PTKs with- 
out encountering serious problems. As dis- 
cussed in Section I(A) the singling out of 
emigrant PTKs for special treatment would 
raise delicate political and moral problems and 
may violate certain human rights guaranteed 
under international law.12 These problems, like 
those arising from an unorthodox definition of 
residence,13 would be obstacles to obtaining 
the administrative assistance of the DCs and to 
obtaining the voluntary compliance of the 
PTKs. 
Other reasons exist for the LDC not to limit 
its citizenship jurisdiction to PTKs. By bringing 
all non-resident citizens into its tax net, an LDC 
could broaden its tax base. 14 With a larger tax 
base, the LDC could lower its tax rate on 
foreign income and still raise as much revenue 
as it would by applying a higher rate to just the 
earnings of PTKs. Keeping the tax rate low has 
two major advantages. First, the emigrant PTK 
is not likely to engage in tax avoidance or 
evasion if the amount of tax at stake is not 
large. Second, the PTK’s decision to emigrate is 
unlikely to be affected by a low rate; thus 
conflict with basic individual rights can be 
avoided. 
If all non-resident citizens are brought into 
the tax net,1 5 the LDC need not define who is 
a PTK for tax purposes. Any attempt to define 
a PTK would involve drawing fine distinctions, 
and considerable strain would be placed on the 
definition by manoeuvres to circumvent it. Any 
weakness in the definition would operate to the 
advantage of the taxpayer. 
2. Renunciation of citizenship by the PTK. 
The LDC’s assertion of jurisdiction on the basis 
of citizenship might induce a PTK to renounce 
his citizenship in order to avoid LDC taxation. 
Though one result would be a revenue loss to 
the LDC, another, more important, conse- 
quence would be a lowering of the probability 
that the PTK would eventually return to the 
LDC. Imposing an income tax on non-resident 
citizens might therefore not be in the LDC’s 
best interests to the extent that it resulted in 
wholesale renunciations of citizenship. 
Could the LDC ignore a PTK’s renunciation 
of citizenship, at least for the purpose of assert- 
ing tax jurisdiction? Again, international law 
offers little guidance since no country has 
attempted such a broad assertion of tax 
jurisdiction.16 It may, however, be useful to 
distinguish two situations. A PTK who 
renounces his LDC citizenship can either 
acquire a new citizenship or else become state- 
less. The LDC’s assertion of tax jurisdiction 
over the PTK once he has acquired citizenship 
in the DC would raise the same problems as an 
unorthodox definition of residence. In contrast, 
an LDC policy that discouraged persons from 
becoming stateless in order to avoid taxation 
would seem reasonable.17 Thus one approach 
the LDC could adopt would be to recognize the 
11. In some countries, the taxation of the foreign 
earnings of a non-resident citizen may conflict with 
constitutional doctrines proscribing legislation having 
an extraterritorial effect. For example, some Canadian 
constitutional-law scholars felt that, prior to 1931, 
Canada was precluded from enacting legislation having 
an extraterritorial effect. In 1931, the Canadian Parlia- 
ment, passed the Statute of’ Westminster, which 
expressly authorized such legislation. The Statute of 
Westminster clearly established the power to tax non- 
resident citizens on their foreign income, though 
Canada has never chosen to exercise this power. 
Sherbaniuk, Hutcheon, and Brissenden, op. cit., p. 
316. 
12. The LDC’s domestic law may also prevent the 
singling out of PTKs for special tax treatment. 
13. An assertion of citizenship jurisdiction by the 
LDC might also be viewed as creating a conflict 
between the two countries. The short answer is that 
countries accept certain conflicts as being legitimate 
and inevitable. The conflict between citizenship 
jurisdiction and residence jurisdiction is, by custom 
and practice, considered acceptable. The conflict 
created by a deviant definition of resident would, 
however, be considered illegitimate. 
14. The extent to which the tax base could be 
broadened depends on how narrow a definition of 
PTK an LDC contemplated. 
15. In some LDCs. e.g., Britain’s former colonies in 
Africa, the brain drain may consist of PTKs who are 
not citizens of the LDC. The assertion of citizenship 
jurisdiction would obviously not reach this group. 
16. The United States has a provision designed to 
discourage citizens from giving up their citizenship and 
moving abroad in order to avoid US tax. Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, 5 877. The special tax 
imposed on expatriates extends only to their US 
investment income and income effectively connected 
with the conduct of a trade or business within the 
United States. No attempt is made to tax their foreign 
earnings that have no connection with the United 
States. 
17. Statelessness is frowned upon in international law. 
See Paul Weis, ‘The United Nations Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, 1961’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11 (1962) p. 1073. 
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PTK’s renunciation of citizenship only if he 
obtained a new citizenship.rs In the case of a 
PTK who had emigrated to the United States, 
the LDC could levy its tax for at least five 
years, which is the length of time an immigrant 
must normally wait before applying for US 
citizenship. 19 
If the LDC asserts tax jurisdiction over the 
PTK during his first five years in the United 
States, the PTK would have nothing to gain 
from renouncing his LDC citizenship. From the 
LDC’s point of view, however, limiting taxation 
to a five-year period may reduce potential 
revenues. The PTK’s early years in a DC might 
not be productive in terms of income, 
especially if he spends part of the time in 
school. Furthermore, the PTK may be able to 
reduce his income during this period by work- 
ing under a deferred compensation agreement. 
Devising rules to minimize tax avoidance 
through renunciation of citizenship is difficult, 
and no one solution appears to be completely 
satisfactory. The problem of wholesale renun- 
ciations may, however, be larger in theory than 
in fact. An LDC tax that imposes only a modest 
burden on the PTK is not likely to result in 
renunciation. Renunciation would also be un- 
attractive to a PTK whose close family 
members remained in the LDC with no thought 
of emigrating or to a PTK who was uncertain 
about his future plans. Moreover, cultural and 
social patterns are likely to influence a PTK’s 
decision; the strength of his ties to the LDC 
may outweigh the tax savings from renuncia- 
tion. 
3. Relieffrom double taxation. International 
double taxation can result when a taxpayer or 
his income has jurisdictional connections with 
more than one country. Since a DC will tax a 
PTK on income earned within the DC, double 
taxation will occur if the LDC also taxes the 
PTK. 
Suppose a PTK has taxable income of 
$20,000 derived entirely from employment 
within the United States. Assume that the US 
tax would be levied at an effective rate of 25 
per cent, resulting in a US tax liability of 
$5,000. If the LDC levies its regular income tax 
on the same base,*0 $20,000, at an effective 
rate of 45 per cent, the LDC tax liability would 
be $9,000. The total tax burden on the PTK’s 
earnings would be $14,000 ($5,000+ $9,000), 
for an over-all effective rate of 70 per cent. 
As the example illustrates, the burden of 
double taxation can be quite onerous. Most 
countries that tax foreign income therefore use 
some type of credit mechanism to provide 
relief.2 1 In its simplest form, such a mechanism 
would require the taxpayer to compute his tax 
liability and then take as a credit against that 
liability the amount of any foreign tax paid on 
the income.** The PTK in the example would 
take a credit for the US tax of $5,000, thereby 
lowering his LDC tax liability from $9,000 to 
$4,000. From the US point of view, the PTK 
has no foreign income and thus cannot take a 
credit against his US tax liability. The final 
result is that the PTK pays tax to the United 
States at a rate of 25 per cent and to the LDC 
at a rate of 20 per cent. 
In short, as long as long as the LDC tax rate 
is higher than the US rate, the credit results in 
tax being paid to the LDC at a rate equal to the 
excess of the effective LDC rate over the effec- 
tive US rate (the 20 per cent final result in the 
example). As long as the PTK’s earnings are 
high by LDC standards, the effective LDC tax 
rate will probably exceed the effective US rate, 
and the LDC will therefore receive some tax 
revenue from the PTK. Should the US rate be 
higher than the LDC rate, however, the credit 
for taxes paid to the United States will exceed 
and thus cancel the LDC tax liability. If the 
rates in the example were reversed, the PTK 
would pay $9,000 in US tax, and credit this 
foreign tax against his LDC liability of $5,000. 
Under these circumstances, the LDC would 
receive no tax revenue from the PTK. 
18. Such an approach would be similar to the US 
common-law rule that a person does not lose one 
domicile until he has acquired another. 
19. Under certain conditions (e.g., marriage to an 
American citizen), the waiting period may be less than 
live years. 
20. The LDC will determine the PTK’s taxable 
income according to its own definition. The LDC’s 
determination of the PTK’s taxable income does not 
have to correspond with that of the United States. 
21. Among the countries using the credit method are 
Canada, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and West Germany. Other countries 
may agree to grant a credit for taxes paid to countries 
with which they have tax treaties. The United States, 
for example, requires its tax treaty partners to grant a 
credit to their residents for income tax paid to the 
United States. Elisabeth Owens, The Foreign Tax 
Credit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, Inter- 
national Tax Program, 1961) p. 20, n.30. 
22. For an in-depth analysis of the US foreign tax 
credit, see Owens, op. cit. 
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If the goal of the LDC is to maximize its 
revenue, it should not allow a credit for foreign 
taxes. Moreover, no principle of international 
law requires a country to provide relief from 
the burden of double taxation.23 Indeed, if an 
LDC wanted to increase the economic cost of 
the PTK’s decision to work abroad, it would 
adopt no relief provisions whatsoever. The lack 
of relief provisions may be counterproductive in 
a revenue sense, however, because it would 
encourage the PTK to evade or avoid the LDC 
tax. 
In deciding whether or not to adopt some 
method of relief, the LDC must consider the 
attitude of the host DC, especially if the LDC 
will need assistance from the DC in enforcing 
its tax. The United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and West Germany, all of which use 
the foreign tax credit as a means of relief, are 
not likely to help enforce an LDC tax whose 
burden they deem excessive. Furthermore, 
without some relief mechanism, the over-all tax 
burden on PTK earnings would be high enough 
in most cases to deter the PTK from emigrating. 
If the DCs are sensitive to the effect of the LDC 
tax on emigration, the LDC would have to be 
willing to adopt some method of relief as a 
precondition to requesting the DC’s administra- 
tive assistance. 
The credit mechanism eliminates only the 
burden resulting from double taxation. As the 
effective LDC rate in the example (45 per cent) 
indicates, the PTK’s income in the DC makes 
him appear quite affluent by LDC standards. A 
salary that is considered to be no more than 
adequate by US standards may well thrust the 
PTK into the LDC’s upper tax brackets. An 
LDC income tax that would be appropriate if 
the PTK were living in the LDC could border 
on being confiscatory when measured against 
the cost of living in the DC. Thus the relief 
afforded by the credit mechanism might not be 
sufficient. Instead, the LDC might consider 
adopting a special tax for foreign income (see 
Part A (5) below). 
4. Administrative considerations. Policing a 
tax on non-resident citizens creates problems 
even for a sophisticated tax administration such 
as that of the United States. Since many LDCs 
are inefficient tax collectors in the domestic 
situation, the assertion of citizenship jurisdic- 
tion over non-residents may cause severe en- 
forcement problems. In countries plagued by 
low taxpayer morality and lacking experience in 
the taxation of foreign income, the problems 
will be compounded. 
An LDC using a pure schedular-type system 
will have had no experience in taxing foreign 
income. Furthermore, the reason the country 
uses a schedular-type system and taxes only 
domestic income may be that its tax admini- 
stration is not capable of administering a global 
system.24 An LDC using a global-type system, 
however, will have had some experience in 
taxing the foreign income of its residents. 
Despite this experience, an LDC will find it 
harder to enforce a tax on the foreign income 
of emigrant PTKs than on that of residents. 
The willingness of PTKs to comply with the 
tax laws of their LDCs will depend on the 
loyalties that they feel. PTKs may constitute a 
most recalcitrant group of taxpayers: not only 
may they fail to see the justice in a tax burden 
that exceeds that of their colleagues in the DC, 
but they may also have no intention of contri- 
buting to the costs of a government with whose 
pohcies they disagree. Secure in the belief that 
the LDC does not have easy access to their 
financial affairs in the DC, PTKs may feel 
confident to file a tax return containing false 
information. Indeed, a PTK who has cut,all ties 
with his LDC may see no need to file a return 
at all.25 Obtaining accurate information about 
a PTK’s taxable income is the first problem an 
LDC faces in administering a tax on non- 
residents. Once the PTK’s tax liability has been 
determined, the second problem lies in collect- 
ing the amount owed. 
In order to obtain the information necessary 
to assess a recalcitrant PTK, the LDC may 
engage in some form of unilateral action. For 
example, an LDC tax administrator could go to 
the DC and conduct his own investigation. This 
approach is obviously expensive; moreover, the 
DC may regard the tax administrator’s presence 
as an intrusion on its national sovereignty. For 
these reasons, unilateral action is rarely used 
unless large amounts of revenue are involved.26 
A more effective and less expensive 
approach open to the LDC is to enlist the 
co-operation of the DC’s tax administration. If 
the desired information is not already available, 
23. Non, op. cit., p. 438. 
24. In some countries, the existence of a schedular 
system reflects the Political reality that those in power 
have substantial amounts of foreign income. 
25. The failure to receive returns from taxpayers 
abroad is a problem that plagues all countries. See 
John Surr, ‘Intertax: intergovernmental co-operation 
in taxation’, Harvard International Law Club Journal, 
Vol. 7 (1966) p. 203. 
26. ibid., p. 182. 
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it will be easier for the DC’s tax administration 
to make the appropriate investigation than for 
the LDC’s. Furthermore, the PTK’s knowledge 
that the LDC can readily obtain information 
about his financial situation will encourage him 
to comply with the tax laws of the LDC by 
filing an accurate return in the first place. 
The United States does not exchange tax 
information on an informal basis. Information 
is exchanged only under conditions specified in 
a tax treaty. The actual information exchanged 
varies from treaty to treaty. Certain readily 
available information, such as a list of foreign 
taxpayers receiving investment income from 
which US taxes have been withheld, may be 
routinely exchanged, especially if such informa- 
tion has already been compiled for US tax 
purposes. Non-routine information, for 
example, information on a specific taxpayer, 
must be specially requested by a foreign govern- 
ment and usually will be supplied only in 
certain limited circumstances. In practice, the 
number of individuals about whom information 
is exchanged is not large.27 
At the least, the LDC would want informa- 
tion from the United States on the income 
earned by any PTK who has failed to file a 
return. Ideally, the LDC would also want cor- 
roborative information on PTKs who have filed 
returns. Although compiling this information 
would be feasible, it would far exceed the 
current US practice. 
Once the PTK’s tax liability has been 
assessed, the LDC is faced with the problem of 
collecting the tax owed. The problem is simpli- 
fied if the PTK has assets within the LDC which 
may be liquidated to satisfy his tax debt. Such 
assets would also provide the means of enforc- 
ing a penalty imposed on a PTK for failure to 
file a return. If the PTK has removed all his 
assets to the DC,*s the LDC has four options. 
It may (1) ignore the tax owed until the PTK 
returns, if ever; (2) use non-tax measures as 
leverage to encourage payment of the tax; (3) 
collect the tax through the DC’s courts; or (4) 
ask the DC for administrative assistance. 
The first option provides the PTK with an 
obvious disincentive to return to the LDC. Even 
if the PTK were to return, his accumulated tax 
bill might outstrip his financial resources. This 
option also has the disadvantage of putting the 
PTK in the position of being able to negotiate 
for a lower tax liability as a condition of his 
returning. 
The effectiveness of the second option 
depends on what measures for applying pres- 
sure on the PTK are available to the LDC. For 
example, the PTK may have to ask the LDC to 
renew his passport or his medical or engineering 
licence, and the LDC can refuse to co-operate 
unless the PTK’s tax liability has been 
satisfied.29 Certainly not every PTK will have 
the occasion to seek assistance from his LDC of 
origin, but should such an occasion arise, a PTK 
may not be willing to relinquish his passport or 
professional licence. 
The third option may not be available to all 
DCs. The British, Canadian,30 and American 
courts, for example, will not recognize a foreign 
tax judgement, apparently on the theory that a 
tax is an assertion of a foreign country’s 
sovereignty which another independent country 
should not tolerate within its borders. A similar 
argument is sometimes made that taxes are 
closely connected with public policy and 
foreign relations; by ruling on the validity of 
foreign taxes, the judiciary might embarrass its 
own country or the foreign country. 3 1 
The fourth option, engaging the assistance of 
the DC’s tax administration, is the most effec- 
tive one. Since the DC has jurisdiction both 
over the PTK and over his assets within the DC, 
27. See Elisabeth Owens, ‘United States income tax 
treaties: their role in relieving double taxation’, 
Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 17 (1963) p. 450. 
28. Property of the FTK may reenter the LDC at a 
later date. For example, the F’TK may send to relatives 
within the LDC cash or other property that can be 
seized and credited against the tax liability. 
29. Compare the Venezuelan use of certificates of 
solvency; see Patrick Kelley and Oliver Oldman (eds.), 
Readings on Income Tax Administration (Mineola, 
NY: Foundation Press, 1973) pp. 510-15. 
30. See, e.g., United States of America v. Harden, 41 
DLR (2d) 721 (1963); 
31. Surr, op. cit., p. 222. For criticism of this 
doctrine, see Lawrence Robertson, ‘Extraterritorial 
enforcement of tax obligations’, Arizona Law Review, 
Vol. 7 (1966) p. 219. 
Although the US courts will not enforce foreign 
tax judgements, they will, under certain conditions, 
enforce non-tax judgements. The US court must be 
convinced (1) that the foreign court had proper 
jurisdiction to issue the judgement; (2) that a fair trial 
was conducted under a system of jurisprudence likely 
to secure an impartial administration of justice; (3) 
that the judgement was not procured by fraud; and (4) 
that the underlying cause of action is not contrary to 
the public policy of the United States. See American 
Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Con- 
flict of Laws (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute 
Publishers, 1971) Q 98; see also Monrad Paulsen and 
Michael Sovern, ‘ “Public Policy” in the conflict of 
laws’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 56 (1956) p. 969. 
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it is obviously in a position to bring to bear the 
full weight of its own collection machinery. A 
tax administration that is asked to provide 
collection assistance may either (1) refuse all 
collection assistance; (2) provide some collec- 
tion assistance informally; or (3) agree to 
undertake collection assistance only in accor- 
dance with a formal commitment. 
Many tax administrations have refused to 
engage in intergovernmental tax collection 
assistance of any kind.32 A country that feels it 
would gain very little through such co- 
operation will not wish to expend its limited 
administrative personnel in collecting taxes on 
behalf of a foreign country.33 Other tax 
administrations may, under certain circum- 
stances, informally help another country collect 
its taxes. If a PTK does not dispute the amount 
of LDC tax assessed, a DC tax administration 
might send him a letter demanding that he pay 
the amount owed. This apparent joining of 
forces by the LDC and the DC could be enough 
to frighten the taxpayer into paying, even if 
neither the tax administration nor the courts 
were to take any action if the PTK ignored the 
letter. 
The United States does not engage in collec- 
tion assistance on an informal basis. Any collec- 
tion assistance offered by the United States-or, 
for that matter, by most Western European 
countries-is in pursuance of a formal com- 
mitment contained in a tax treaty.34 Most 
treaties have explicit provisions pledging each 
country’s assistance to the other in the collec- 
tion of taxes, but assistance is usually limited to 
situations in which taxpayers wrongfully seek 
to obtain treaty benefits.35 The case of a PTK 
who has failed to pay taxes to an LDC is not 
such a situation. Only one recent US treaty 
provides for assistance under more general 
circumstances. 3 6 
The use of collection assistance agreements 
is a relatively undeveloped area.37 Over and 
above taxpayer resistance to such provisions, 
which is undoubtedly an obstacle to their 
adoption,38 difficult policy questions must also 
be resolved. For example, under what condi- 
tions can one country refuse to assist the other 
in the collection of taxes? If an LDC levies a 
tax only on non-residents who are PTKs, and if 
a similar tax would be unconstitutional if 
enacted by the United States, should the 
United States nonetheless provide collection 
assistance to the LDC? How can the taxpayer 
be protected against arbitrary conduct by the 
taxing country? The lack of agreement on these 
issues has hindered intergovernmental co- 
operation in the collection of taxes. 
As this brief survey of existing practices 
indicates, some precedent does exist for inter- 
national co-operation in the exchange of tax 
information and, to a much lesser extent, in the 
collection of foreign taxes. The limited amount 
of co-operation now being offered, however, 
would clearly be inadequate if more than just a 
few PTKs failed to comply with the LDC tax 
laws. Intergovernmental co-operation is thus no 
substitute for voluntary compliance by the 
PTK. 
Assuming a DC was willing to offer broader 
assistance than usual, it might not do so with- 
out the assurance that other DCs were similarly 
inclined. Otherwise, any DC that was compet- 
ing with other DCs for special types of PTKs 
(e.g., doctors) might fear that its enforcement 
efforts would only divert immigration to those 
countries not willing to offer the same assis- 
tance. Whether all the DCs could come to an 
agreement on the appropriate amount of assis- 
tance is doubtful. 
5. Rates of an LDC tax. The amount of LDC 
tax liability has a strong bearing on taxpayer 
32. Surr, op. cit., p. 220. 
33. This feeling was also echoed in recent conver- 
sations between the authors and officials of the US 
Internal Revenue Service. 
34. Historically, the United States has not entered 
into collection assistance agreements, or exchange of 
information agreements, independently of a tax 
treaty. 
35. e.g., ‘[Elach of the Contracting States shall 
endeavour to collect such taxes imposed by the other 
Contracting State as will ensure that any exemption or 
reduced rate of tax granted under this Convention by 
that other Contracting State shall not be enjoyed by 
persons not entitled to such benefits.’ Article 27, 
United StatessJapan Tax Treaty. 
36. ‘The two Contracting States undertake to lend 
assistance and support to each other in the collection 
of the taxes to which the present Convention relates 
. . in cases where the taxes are definitely due accord- 
ing to the laws of the State making the application.’ 
Article 27, United States-France Tax Treaty. 
37. Officials consulted in the US Internal Revenue 
Service could not remember any case in which the 
Service collected a tax on behalf of a foreign govern- 
ment. They stated repeatedly, ‘Let them fight their 
own battles, we’re overworked as it is’. 
38. Owens, The Foreign Tax Credit, op. cit., p. 451. 
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compliance, as well as on many of the other 
problems discussed above. Although some 
emigrant PTKs will not co-operate with the 
LDC under any circumstances, the behaviour of 
most will be influenced by the size of the LDC 
tax on their foreign earnings. If the burden of 
the LDC tax is not unreasonable, the PTK is 
less likely to renounce his LDC citizenship or 
use other means of evading or avoiding the tax. 
Furthermore, the DC is more likely to assist the 
LDC in collecting the tax if the rate is low 
enough not to influence the PTK’s decision to 
emigrate or constitute a hardship while he is 
living in the DC. Thus considerable care must 
be used in designing the rate structure of an 
LDC tax. 
The LDC can choose among a number of 
approaches in setting tax rates for the PTK. It 
can ignore the fact that the PTK is abroad and 
apply its regular rate schedule to the PTK’s 
foreign earnings. In many cases, however, this 
approach will result in a tax burden that is 
heavy by DC standards, even if some relief is 
provided through a credit for DC taxes.39 
Alternatively, the LDC could adopt a flat rate 
for foreign income or if an element of progres- 
sivity were desired, a special progressive rate 
schedule could be designed for foreign income. 
A rate schedule appropriate for one DC may 
not be appropriate for another DC. A special 
schedule may therefore have to be developed 
for each DC. 
A more satisfactory approach might be for 
the LDC to levy a surtax on the amount of the 
tax that the PTK pays to the host DC. In other 
words, the LDC tax would be equal to a per- 
centage of the DC tax.40 One advantage of 
such a surtax is that it relates the additional tax 
burden imposed by the LDC to the DC tax. 
Since the DC tax reflects what the DC regards 
as a fair tax burden, the LDC has a convenient 
means of assuring that the additional burden 
resulting from its tax will not be unreasonable 
by DC standards. Demands for progressivity 
would be satisfied since the surtax would 
reflect the progressivity of the DC rate struc- 
ture. Another advantage of the surtax is that 
the LDC need not grant a credit for DC taxes or 
design some other relief mechanism.41 
B. US tax measures 
1. A tax on PTKs. In one version of his pro- 
posal, Bhagwati suggests that the host DCs 
should levy a special tax on PTKs and remit the 
proceeds to the LDCs of origin. Whether a 
special US tax on PTKs would be constitutional 
is not clear. With respect to state legislation, the 
US Supreme Court has recently gone very far in 
striking down statutes that discriminate against 
aliens.42 The Court has recognized that aliens 
as a class constitute a discrete and insular 
minority for which a heightened degree of 
judicial protection is appropriate.43 Accord- 
ingly, the burden of proof placed on a state to 
justify discrimination is extremely heavy. 
If the Court were to adopt the same 
standard in reviewing federal legislation, it 
would probably find a special tax on PTKs 
unconstitutional. The constitutional provision 
relevant to state legislation is different, how- 
ever, from that relevant to federal legislation.44 
The same test may therefore not be required in 
determining the constitutionality of a special 
tax on PTKs. Furthermore, in comparison with 
state statutes, federal statutes contain 
numerous examples of discrimination against 
39. See Part A (3) supra. 
40. Since the DC tax applies to all of the PTK’s 
income, an adjustment would be required if it were 
desired to limit the surtax to just the l7K’s earned 
income. 
41. The surtax could incorporate various refinements. 
For example, a floor could be provided so that a PTK 
who paid little DC tax as a result of taking advantage 
of what the LDC viewed as tax loopholes would none- 
theless pay a minimum tax to the LDC. At the other 
extreme, a ceiling could be provided to reduce hard- 
ship. 
42. Graham v. Richardson, 403 US 365 (1971); 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 US 634 (1973); In re 
Griffiths, 413 US 717 (1973). 
43. Graham v. Richardson, 403 US 365, 372 (1971). 
44. The fourteenth amendment is applicable to state 
legislation: ‘[N] or shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.’ The fifth amendment is 
applicable to federal legislation: ‘No person shall . . 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. . . .’ State legislation discriminating 
against aliens has been invalidated primarily on the 
basis of the equal protection clause found in the 
fourteenth amendment but missing from the fifth 
amendment. But see Boiling v. Sha-ve, 347 US 497, 
499 (1954) (discrimination by the federal government 
‘may be so unjustifiable as to be viola&e of due 
process’). 
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aliens.45 The Court might be wary of adopting 
an approach that would perhaps invalidate 
many of these federal statutes. Finally, Con- 
gress’s plenary power to control and regulate 
immigration may limit the rights of aliens to 
challenge federal legislation.46 
Two important aspects of a US tax on PTKs 
may be of overriding importance, however. 
First, the primary purpose of the tax would be 
to protect the interests of the LDCs, whereas 
the discrimination in existing federal statutes is 
arguably in the interests of US national 
security.47 Second, the tax may put the PTK at 
a social or economic disadvantage in com- 
parison to a US citizen receiving the same 
salary; his chances of obtaining adequate 
housing and education, for example, would be 
reduced because his after-tax earnings would be 
lower. These differences could be enough to 
render the tax unconsitutional, regardless of the 
approach taken by the Supreme Court in 
reviewing federal legislation. More guidance in 
this area will be forthcoming because the 
Supreme Court is currently considering two 
cases in which federal statutes discriminating 
against aliens were successfully challenged in 
the lower courts.48 
Even if the legality of a US tax on PTKs 
were beyond question, it is extremely doubtful 
that Congress would enact such a tax. With no 
direct interests of the United States at stake, 
Congress is not likely to entertain a measure 
having such serious social and political over- 
tones.49 Yet without the participation of the 
United States, no country competing with it for 
PTKs could risk implementing the tax. 
2. Charitable contributions. An approach 
available in the United States, though probably 
not in most other DCs, relies on the use of a tax 
incentive to encourage charitable contributions. 
Under US law, a PTK could receive a tax deduc- 
tion for donations to qualifying UN agencies 
and organizations created under US law which 
use their contributions for charitable purposes 
within the LDCs.50 A major attraction of this 
approach is its lack of compulsion-the decision 
by the emigrant PTK to contribute funds to his 
LDC of origin is an entirely voluntary one. 
The more financially successful the PTK is, 
the more he may wish to use charitable contri- 
butions to express his appreciation for 
educational or other opportunities afforded 
him by the LDC and to enable the LDC to 
provide similar opportunities for others. The 
tax savings, which increase as income increases, 
in combination with the moral pressure on the 
PTK to make regular contributions, could result 
in large sums being made available over time. 
Indeed, efforts to persuade an emigrant PTK to 
make funds available to his LDC or to LDCs in 
general, might be increased the longer he was 
abroad, and the higher his income level. A 
further advantage of the tax incentive for 
charitable contributions is that it gives the PTK 
no reason to renounce his LDC citizenship. 
C. UN measures 
1. A tax on emigrant PTKs. The United 
Nations provides the best institutional frame- 
work for reaching agreement on the proper 
balance among the interests of the DCs, the 
LDCs, and the PTKs. It is also the most appro- 
priate forum for resolving conflicts between the 
Bhagwati proposal and international law. The 
imprimatur of the United Nations will increase 
the political and moral attractiveness of a tax on 
PTKs; indeed, effective implementation of the 
Bhagwati proposal is likely to occur only under 
UN auspices. 
One approach would be for the United 
Nations to levy its own tax on the earnings of 
emigrant PTKs.5 1 The host DCs would act as 
45. Patrick Travers, ‘The constitutional status of state 
and federal governmental discrimination against 
resident aliens’, Harvard International Law Journal, 
Vol. 16 (1975) p. 129. See, e.g., 47 USC 5 310 
(1973) (denying aliens the right to hold radio station 
licences); 10 USC p 8 3285,5571,8285 (1973) (deny- 
ing aliens the right to hold regular commissions as 
officers in the US armed forces); 46 USC 0 8 808, 883 
(1973) (denying aliens the right to participate in intra- 
coastal shipping). 
46. See Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 
US 410 (1948); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
US 698 (1893). See also Travers, op. cit., p. 130. 
47. Travers, op. cit., p. 129. 
48. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th 
Cir, 1974), cert. granted, 94 S. 0. 3067 (1974); 
Weinberger v. Diaz, 361 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1973), 
prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 2381 (1974). 
49. A special tax on PTKs is also difficult to admini- 
ster. The problems are identical to those of a UN tax 
collected by a DC. See Part C (1) infra. 
50. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 0 170. 
51. The United Nations does not possess its own 
power of taxation. The right to tax a PTK would have 
to be delegated to it by the host DC or by the LDC. 
Neither the DC nor the LDC could delegate more 
power than it could exercise itself. The legality of a 
UN tax on PTKs will therefore depend on whether 
such a tax would be permitted under the laws of the 
DC or the LDC. 
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collection agents and transmit the tax proceeds 
to the United Nations. A UN tax has a number 
of advantages. It would relieve the inequities 
and hardships that might result if each LDC 
levied its own tax on emigrant PTKs. The 
replacement of numerous LDC taxes with a 
single UN tax would contribute to admini- 
strative simplicity. By co-ordinating the collec- 
tion of the tax, the United Nations would allay 
fears that some DCs were purposely not enforc- 
ing the tax in order to attract immigrant PTKs. 
The United Nations is also in the best position 
to develop rules for taxing PTKs who have 
surrendered their citizenship. 
The UN tax could take the form of a surtax, 
for reasons similar to those discussed in Part A 
(5) above. At first glance, a surtax appears 
simple to administer since it is based on the DC 
tax. In many respects, however, the admini- 
stration of a surtax applicable only to PTKs, 
rather than to all taxpayers, is equivalent to the 
administration of an entirely separate tax. The 
tax administration must (1) prepare special tax 
forms; (2) compile the roll of taxpayers subject 
to the tax; (3) design special withholding tables; 
(4) develop current payment programmes for 
the self-employed and other taxpayers not 
subject to withholding; (5) plan taxpayer 
information programmes, including the pre- 
paration of descriptive pamphlets and mass 
education programmes concerning filing 
requirements; (6) write regulations and rulings 
to answer ambiguities in the taxing statute; and 
(7) train officials to answer questions from tax- 
payers and to deal with disputes on appeal. 
Most of these problems are manageable,52 but 
they must be thought through in a new con- 
text. 
For example, take the problem of the 
establishment and maintenance of the tax roll 
for a surtax on PTKs. Some mechanism must be 
developed so that both the tax administration 
and employer withholding agents can easily 
separate PTKs from other taxpayers. To expect 
the PTKs to identify themselves without some 
effective enforcement machinery is unrealistic. 
Employers will make the appropriate inquiries 
only under pressure of penalties. An approach 
with promise appears to be for the tax admini- 
stration to obtain the information from the 
immigration bureau. 
For the immigration bureau to establish pro- 
cedures for identifying newly entering PTKs 
wouId not be a major problem.5 3 The informa- 
tion compiled by the bureau could be passed to 
the tax administration and entered into its com- 
puters. Computerization seems essential to the 
effective use of such information. 
At the time of entry of the PTK, the immi- 
gration bureau will be unable to obtain two 
pieces of information which are extremely 
valuable: the current address in the DC of each 
PTK and his taxpayer identification number. 
The identification number is critical in com- 
puterized operations; without it, correlating the 
information from the immigration bureau with 
the tax returns being filed would be nearly 
impossible. In some countries, the immigration 
bureau might be able to obtain the taxpayer 
identification number of the PTK sometime 
after his arrival, especially if all aliens were 
required to register annually. 
If the tax administration is capable of identi- 
fying the PTKs, it would be able to send each 
of them a copy of the special tax form. The 
PTK could also be required to inform his 
employer of his status for withholding pur- 
poses. His failure to inform his employer would 
be detected by the computer at the time of 
filing and could subject the delinquent PTK to 
fines or other penalties..A system of directly 
notifying employers of the PTK status of their 
employees may be feasible in some countries. 
2. An assessment on host DCs. Under an 
appropriate grant of authority, the United 
Nations could be given the power to levy an 
assessment on host DCs. The .assessment would 
recognize the benefits accruing to the host DCs 
from the immigration of persons whose talents 
are in short supply in all countries. The prweeds 
would be earmarked for use in the LDCs, so 
that they might be compensated, at least 
partially, for the professional and technical 
skills lost through emigration and for the funds 
spent in educating emigrant PTKs.54 
The assessment could be a function of the 
number of PTKs who immigrated to the DC, 
the amount .of their income, the amount of tax 
they paid to the DC, the need for their skills in 
52. Somewhat analogous problems are encountered in 
the United States when a state decides for the first 
time to adopt a personal income tax. 
53. Obtaining the names of F’TKs already in the 
country, however, would be difficult, since whatever 
information was in the bureau’s files would not be 
current or organized in a readily usable form. The 
bureau could, of course, change its procedures long 
before the UN tax became operational. Furthermore, 
the UN tax could be applied prospectively, thus 
excluding PTKs already in the country. 
54. A host DC is obviously free to adopt a foreign aid 
programme based on these principles without the 
participation of other DCs or of the United Nations. 
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the LDCs of origin, or some other combination 
of factors that would reflect the costs and pro- 
blems of specific LDCs as well as the benefits 
obtained by the DCs. The administrative pro- 
blems posed by a UN assessment on host DCs 
are modest in comparison with those en- 
countered in levying a tax on individual PTKs. 
Some measure of the income of PTKs is 
necessary in order to compute their contri- 
bution to the host DC. Only aggregate data is 
needed, however, and such information can be 
obtained from sample surveys and cross- 
sectional studies, which are updated 
periodically. The need for annual assessment 
and collection of tax from individual PTKs is 
obviated. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
Of the three approaches examined, the least 
feasible appears to be a special DC tax on the 
earnings of emigrant PTKs. In the US context, 
such a tax would encounter serious political 
opposition and constitutional barriers. 
An LDC tax on all non-resident citizens 
would be compatible with existing jurisdic- 
tional concepts of taxation, but the problems 
of enforcement are formidable. Each LDC will 
have to evaluate whether it can achieve the level 
of enforcement necessary to implement the tax. 
The factors to be considered in making this 
evaluation are: (I) the over-all efficiency of the 
LDC’s tax administration; (2) the LDC’s prior 
experience with taxing foreign income; (3) the 
existing level of taxpayer morality; (4) the 
social and economic conditions that generated 
PTK emigration; (5) the LDC’s access to the 
assets of emigrant PTKs; (6) possible renuncia- 
tion of citizenship by PTKs in order to avoid 
the tax; and (7) the host DC’s attitude toward 
assisting in the collection of foreign taxes. Most 
LDCs will require substantial assistance from 
the host DCs in administering the tax; yet little 
precedent exists for such widespread inter- 
governmental cooperation. 
The United Nations appears to be the only 
institution that can provide a suitable frame- 
work for designing and implementing a tax on 
PTK earnings. The collection of a UN tax 
would, however, require a serious commitment 
on the part of the DCs. Numerous changes in 
existing administrative practices would be 
involved, and the costs of instituting the 
necessary machinery and procedures would be 
substantial. These costs would have to be 
estimated and compared with the revenue 
potential of the tax. Only then could it be 
determined whether the support of the DCs 
might be more productively channelled m some 
other direction in order to attain the objectives 
sought by the Bhagwati proposal. 
